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 Abstract 
 
       The Japanese Government reports that the health of Japanese employees 
deteriorated in the 1990s when Japan suffered severe economic recessions. This paper 
examines the relationship between overtime work and health of employees. We present 
a theoretical model showing that overtime work causes health of individuals to 
deteriorate based on the hypothesis that overtime work is implicitly built into the 
promotion system in a firm. Using the data of 6,985 individuals from the first National 
Family Research in 1998 (NFR98) provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, 
Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, our empirical results support our 
hypothesis and show strong associations among overtime work, health and 
socio-economic characteristics of individuals, as well as labor market conditions.  
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Why is Employee’s Overwork Prevalent in Japan, 
Despite the Adverse Effects on Health? 
I. Introduction 
Overtime work is prevalent in the Japanese labor market.1 A survey made by 
the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (RENGO, in Japanese) in 2002 shows that the 
average of paid overtime work hours in the month of June 2002 was 21 hours per union 
member.2 Furthermore, the average unpaid overtime work hours were 8.7 hours.3 On 
the other hand, Japanese government statistics report rather low overtime work hours; 
the highest monthly-average paid overtime work hours per person in 2002 are 14.3 
hours in firms with over 500 regular employees, while the lowest hours are 7.0 hours in 
firms with 5-29 regular employees.4 Regardless of low or high reported statistics of 
overtime work hours, the distribution of overtime work among employees is not 
uniform in the Japanese labor market. 
As concerns the health of Japanese employees, total mental illness applications 
rose abruptly from 1998 to 2001 (see Figure 1) and there was also a dramatic   
increase in the number of suicides in the late 1990s. The numbers of recognition of total 
physical illness, including brain blood vessel disease and ischemic heart disease, etc, 
                                                  
1 Overwork is not a peculiar aspect only in Japan, but also in the US and European countries 
(Bejean, Sultan-Taïeb and Wolff 2003; Brett and Stroh 2003).  
2 The Japanese Trade Union Confederation (RENGO), the Current Situation of Increasing Job 
Burdens and Unpaid Overwork under Employment Restructure – the Survey Results (Temporary 
Report) from the 2002 RENGO Life Questionnaire –, Table 1, p. 8. In Japanese, “Koyou Risutra no 
Naka-de Taka-maru Sigoto no Fuka to Fuba-rai Zangyo no Zittai – 2002 Rengo Seikatsu Ankeito 
Chosa kekka (Soku-ho) Zittai – .” 
http://www.jtuc-rengo.or.jp/new/download/chousa/2002_seikatu_enq/2002life_enq_sok.pdf  
(2004/01/17). 
3 According to the survey, the average unpaid overtime work hours are 29.6 hours among union 
workers who worked unpaid. 
4 Paid overwork hours beyond contractual work hours are called “Shotei gai Rodo Zikan” in 
Japanese. Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, database system, statistical table, Table 15 
Average monthly actual work hours per person by regular employee divided by scale of sector. 
http://wwwdbtkmhlw.go.jp/toukei/touhyo/indexkr_1_4.html (2004/01/17). 
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showed increasing trends in the 1990s, when Japan experienced severe economic 
recession.5 
 Adverse effects of overwork on health of employees, especially sudden death 
from overwork (Karoshi, in Japanese), have become a hotly debated social issue, while 
sudden death due to cardiovascular and cerebrovascular disease seems to be caused by 
high job strain (Nishiyama and Johnson 1997). The aforementioned RENGO survey 
indicates union workers become more anxious about their health as they work more 
hours beyond contractual hours.6 In addition, according to the First National Family 
Research in 1998 (NFR98: the sample size N = 6,985) made by the Japan Society of 
Family sociology (Nihon Kazoku Shakai Gakkai, in Japanese), less healthy people work 
fewer hours than those in better health (see Table 1).7  
Why do employees accept overwork in their workplace, while the 
epidemiological relationship between overwork and its adverse effects on health cannot 
be ignored? Brett and Stroh (2003) provide one answer for the behavior of longer work 
hours by US male and female managers: people in a higher job status with more 
responsibility seek the higher monetary rewards from long hours as well as 
experiencing peer pressure and seeking an emotional respite from home. In fact, their 
US study reports work stress is associated with longer work hours among male 
managers, as the above RENGO survey shows with Japanese union workers. 
The purpose of this study is twofold: first, we provide a theoretical model to 
                                                  
5 From the original data of Fig 1, we recognize the numbers of recognition of these two types of 
illness are very low relative to the total applications; the applications of brain blood vessel disease 
and ischemic heart disease are 509 and 241 in 2001, respectively, while their respective recognitions 
are 150 and 49.  
6 Gerdtham and Ruhm (2002), Ruhm (2003) , and Grossman (2004) support the idea that health 
improves in a recession.  
7 Grossman (1972) shows good or better health results in more days available for work of an 
individual. 
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explain why Japanese employees choose excessive paid- and unpaid-overtime work 
despite its adverse effects on their health. Second, we empirically test if health improves 
in a recession with Japanese data, as with US data by Gerdtham and Ruhm (2002) and 
Ruhm (2003), since an abrupt increase in the number of health problems with Japanese 
employees occurred during recessions after the burst of the bubble economy in 1990. 
Therefore, unlike the US case, the health of Japanese employees seems to deteriorate 
during a recession. To empirically test our hypotheses on the relationship between 
overtime work and health of employees, we use micro data of 6,985 Japanese 
individuals from the first National Family Research in 1998 (NFR98) made by the 
National Family Research of Japan (NFRJ) of the Japan Society of Family Sociology 
(JSFS: Nihon Kazoku Shakai Gakkai, in Japanese).  
Our empirical findings support the hypothesis that overtime work of employees 
is systematically built into the promotion structure in Japanese firms and, hence, they 
tend to choose overtime work despite the adverse effects on health. Of the relationship 
between overtime work and health, we find employees with good health tend to work 
overtime, but excessive overtime work eventually causes their health to deteriorate; then, 
employees with health problems reduce their labor supply in the market. We 
consequently propose a review of worker-employer implicit relationships to establish an 
explicit and objective evaluation system for job promotion. 
 The following section II presents our theoretical model of the behavior of 
overtime work of employee in a context of the theory of expected utility of income. Our 
empirical results are reported in section III and the summary and conclusion are in 
section IV.  
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II. A Theoretical Model of Overtime Work and Health of Employee 
The purpose of this section is to provide a theoretical model to explain why 
overtime overwork is prevalent among regular employees in Japan.8 There are at least 
three reasons why employees are willing to work overtime.  
First, we consider employee’s incentive to work overtime as a signal of the 
individual’s commitment to the firm where they work. Employees know their paid- and 
unpaid-overtime work incentives are intrinsically built into a job promotion system in 
the firm. Therefore, overtime work is a tactic for a typical employee to maximize their 
individual  labor earning through job promotion. Second, overtime work has another 
aspect reflecting the employee’s lack of competency in their job. That is, a typical 
employee can mask his or her lack of competency to some degree by showing their 
commitment to the firm through overtime work. Third, since the parameter reflecting 
the firm’s evaluation on employee’s incentive for overtime work is not clearly specified 
in the labor contract between the firm and employees, a risk averse attitude leads a 
typical employee to work overtime. In a typical case, by misinterpreting the parameter 
the employee commits excessive overtime work, which eventually causes deterioration 
in health. 
In our theoretical model, we assume a typical employee maximizes his or her 
discounted expected utility of income in two periods such as 0=t  and 1=t , as 
following.9 
                                                  
8 “Regular” employees imply the workers who are hired on an implicitly permanent basis by their 
contracts with firms. They are generally entitled to various kinds of fringe benefits and are in line for 
job promotion in the firm, unlike temporary or part-time workers. Hereafter, we use employees 
synonymous with regular employees.  
9 A typical employee is either female or male in our text. Since overtime work is a typical 
phenomenon and more prevalent among male regular employees than female employees in Japan, 
we treat a typical employee as male to avoid a clumsiness of saying “his or her” every time. 
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where tH  is the health stock of a typical employee at time t : a larger value of H  
implies better health of the individual; )( tHP  is the probability reflecting the 
individual’s health condition, 0
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; tY  is his income from labor; and 
10 << ρ  is a discount factor. Of equation (1), we assume )( tYU  takes a form of tYln  
for our operational purpose. 
The employee chooses optimal hours of overtime work per period to maximize 
his discounted expected utility of income, while his time constraint is given as,  
 
(2) ttt TLLTL +∆+=+=Ω  , 1,0=t ,  
 
where Ω  is a total amount of hours per period, e.g., 24 hours a day; tL  represents 
work hours in period t , consisting of contractual work hours L , e.g., 8 hours per 
day,10 and overtime work hours L∆ ;11 and tT  is total leisure hours in period t . 
Here, we assume that employee’s overtime work in period 0 is intrinsically 
built into the individual’s promotion in the firm and his promotion takes place in the 
second period, 1=t . The promotion scheme is given as follows:  
 
(3) 1
)( 0 <∆==
L
L
L
LLPpro
ββ－
, 0>β ,  
                                                  
10 Contractual work hours L  is called “shotei nai rodou zikan,” in Japanese.  
11 Overtime work hours are in two types such as paid and unpaid. However, we treat 
hours of overtime work in this model as unpaid overtime work. 
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where proP  is the promotion rate; and β  represents the parameter by which the firm 
evaluate employee’s overtime work, which is not explicitly expressed in the labor 
contract between the firm and employees. If the employee wants to be promoted and, 
consequently, has higher labor earnings at 1=t , he chooses overtime work, 
00 >−=∆ LLL , and his promotion rate next period is positive, 10 << proP .12 On the 
other hand, if the employee chooses to work the contractual hours LLt =  at 0=t , 
then the firm will not promote him next period such as 0=proP  and pays the same 
wage rate at 1=t  as W  paid by contract at 0=t . Here, we assume that the firm 
does not have enough information on the employee’s aptitude for the job in the firm and, 
therefore, offers the same wage rate W  to every employee at 0=t  and requests the 
contractual labor hours, L , per period. The wages at 0=t  are LW ⋅  for every 
employee in the firm. 
On the other hand, if the employee chooses to work overtime so as to 0>proP , 
his income at 1=t  is 1)1( LWPpro ⋅+ , where 1L  represents his work hours at 1=t . 
The employee, however, faces some probability of being laid off by the firm in each 
period due to changes in labor market conditions, for which the market unemployment 
rate is proxy. Hence, the income for the employee at 0=t is LWuY )1( 00 φ−=  and the 
income at 1=t  is 111 )1)(1( LWPuY pro+−= φ , where tu  is the market unemployment 
rate in period t  and 10 << φ  is an employment adjustment factor in the firm in 
                                                  
12 We consider a promotion for a typical employee as a movement from a lower job position to a 
higher one and the wage rate at a higher job position is greater than that at a lower one. 
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response to tu . φ  is assumed to be a function of tu  and the firm’s policy is to adjust 
employee’s overtime work in response to changes in the market unemployment rate. 
That is, when the market unemployment rate is high, the firm is more willing to cut 
employees’ overtime work such as 0
)( <=∂
∂
t
t
t
u
u φφ . 
Finally, we also consider that health condition of the employee is affected by 
his health capital, whose value at 0=t  is determined by the amount of hours invested 
in his health production as, 
 
(4) α00 ATH = ,13 
 
where 0H  is health capital of the employee at 0=t ; 0>A  is his inherited stock of 
health; and 00 << α  are a parameter reflecting efficiency of his health production 
and also of his potential ability, e.g., his productivity in the firm. In the second period, 
the health capital of the employee is given by 011 )1( HIH δ−+= , where 1I  is his 
health investment at 1=t , which is assumed 0
0
1 =∂
∂
H
I  for brevity; and 10 << δ  is a 
health depreciation rate of the employee. We assume the stock of health of the employee 
in each period affects the probability of being in good health, )( tHP .
14  The 
                                                  
13 In this definition, we avoid using a complicate health production function since our main focus 
here is not on a health stock function, but rather on showing how overtime work of a typical 
employee affects his health condition. 
14 Here, overtime work of a typical employee influences the probability of being in good health as, 
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. For example, in period 0 we have: 
8 
probability of good health in each period is assumed to influence the level of utility 
derived from consumption by the employee in each period, tC , 1,0=t . Since here we 
assume there is one type of good with the price in unity, the amount of consumption at 
time t  equals the income made by the employee at time t , such as tt YC = .15  
 Now, we assume that the employee maximizes his discounted expected utility of 
income, as defined in equation (1), with respect to his overtime work L∆  and we have: 
 
(5) Π=∆ 0
01 )(
H
THPP
L proα
ρβ &
, 
 
where 0
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>+= pro
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pro P
P
P& ; and 0ln)1(ln 1010 10 >−+=Π+Π=Π YPYP HH δρ , of 
which 0ln 00 0 >=Π YPH  and 0ln)1( 11 1 >−=Π YPHδρ .16 Of equation (5), since we 
define LL =0  when 0=∆L  and LLL ∆+=0  when 0>∆L , if 00 TL <∆< , then 
Π<< 01 )(0 HHPPpro αρβ & . 
 Now, first we evaluate the effect of health condition of a typical employee 0H  
on his overtime work L∆  at 0=t .17 The health effect is as follows: 
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. 
15 To simplify our model, we assume no savings are made in period 0.  
16 The calculation for deriving equation (5) is available upon request. 
17 As the reader will already have noticed, the nature of our model indicates health condition of a 
typical employee is simultaneously related with his overtime work. Therefore, the following 
comparative static analyses may seem redundant. However, the association is not necessarily 
self-explanatory if we assume the law of diminishing marginal probability of health. 
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where 0
)( 1
1
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1
1
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HP
HPH
HPη  which we call the elasticity of health probability; and 
0)( <=
t
ttt
H
t
HHHP P
HPσ  is the marginal elasticity of health probability. Equation (6) 
indicates the sign of the health effect is ambiguous, depending on the value of Ψ  and 
the health effect is positive as long as 1>Ψ .  
Next, with respect to the effect of promotion on overtime work, it is clear from 
equation (5) that we have 0
ln
ln >∆
proPd
Ld . Thus, if overtime work by employees is built 
into the system of promotion in the firm, the individual employee has an incentive to 
work overtime, which leads to a higher job status and consequently raises his wages 
next period.19 Certainly, the employee’s incentive to work overtime is influenced by 
parameter β  in equation (3), whose value is set by the firm.20 Therefore, the amount 
of overtime work by employees can be manipulated when there is asymmetric 
information on β  between the firm and employees. 
 Now, we will examine if a typical employee who is more efficient in producing 
                                                  
18 See Appendix for the calculation process. 
19 Although here we are dealing with unpaid overtime work by a typical employee, this result will 
be the same even paid overtime work is discussed as long as overtime work is built into the 
promotion system in a firm.  
20 The effect of β  on overtime work L∆  is positive since 
0)ln()ln(
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good health tends to work overtime or not. We use α  in equation (4) as a proxy for the 
employee’s efficiency in the health production. The efficiency effect is negative as, 
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If years of schooling are considered a proxy for employee’s efficiency not only in his 
health production but also for his job aptitude in the firm, an individual with more 
schooling years is less likely to work overtime than a counterpart with less schooling.  
Also, the effect of current income 0Y , on overtime work is negative. Through 
the negative income effect, an employee with higher household income will have less 
overtime work per period than one with lower income. In addition, the effect of health 
capital depreciation δ  on overtime work depends on the values of both elasticities of 
health probability 0)( 1 >HPη  and of marginal health probability 0)( 1 <HPσ . The effect 
is negative as long as ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
Π
Π−<Π−
Π 1
)()(
1
11)1( HPHP
σηλδ . If δ  is positively correlated 
with age of employee, then employees tend to work less overtime as they have a job 
tenure. 
 Finally, we now evaluate how labor market conditions affect overtime work of 
                                                  
21 The negative effect is obtained by incorporating the following definitions:  
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employees. When the market unemployment rate is high, the employee will probably be 
more willing to work overtime since his job security is unstable. In addition, as in  the 
experience of Japan during the recession in the 1990s, employees who keep their jobs, 
when their colleagues are laid off are  forced to work overtime in order to take over the 
left tasks due to the layoff. Hence, an increase in layoffs in the firm will have a positive 
effect on overtime work by the firm’s employees in the short run.  
On the other hand, the decision on overtime work by employees during a 
recession may not be always made solely by the employee, but may be decided in 
cooperation with their firm’s decisions. When a recession in the economy becomes 
prolonged, the firm needs to reduce even the  overtime work of employees, which is 
accounted for by altering the value of the employment adjustment factor 10 << φ  and 
0<
tdu
dφ . Therefore, the net effect of unemployment on overtime work of the employee 
depends on the strength of the positive and negative effects.  
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where 00
0
<= φ
φεφ udu
d , which is the firm’s employment adjustment elasticity. Of 
equation (8), the sign is negative if the absolute value of the adjustment elasticity is 
greater than one, 1>φε . 
The result of equation (8) does not take into consideration the effect of 
unemployment on the employee’s health. The studies (Gerdtham and Ruhm 2002, 
Ruhm 2003, and Grossman 2004, p.5) indicate unemployment does affect health of 
12 
individuals, 0
0
0 >∂
∂
u
H
.22 Therefore, the total effect of unemployment on overtime work 
of employees depends on the net effect of the above positive or negative short-run effect 
and the long-run health effect as,   
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where 1
)1(
0
1
0 <−=<
H
Hδω . The first term inside the bracket in the right-hand-side of 
equation (9) is the short-run effect and the second term is the long-run health effect.23 If 
the result of equation (6) prevails and, hence, the long-run health effect is positive, the 
overall unemployment effect on overtime work of the employee in equation (9) 
becomes smaller than the effect obtained from equation (8). 
 So far we have shown how overtime work of a typical employee in a firm is 
affected by socio-economic characteristics of the employee. However, the endogeneity 
problem between overtime work of employees and their health conditions is not clear 
from our theoretical model. Therefore, we empirically provide evidence of endogeneity 
between the two variables of interest in our study.  The next section presents our 
empirical results. 
                                                  
22 Grossman (2004) give the following reason: “One interpretation … is that the consumer’s time is 
an important input into the production of his or her health and that the price of this input falls in a 
recession (Grossman 2004, p.5)”. 
23 The derivation of equation (9) is available upon request. 
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III. Empirical Results 
 Our empirical regression results of overtime work and GHQ (General Health 
Questionnaire: health index) for all individuals aged 28 through 64 are reported in Table 
3-1 and the overtime work regression results for individuals grouped into three 
categories by age (28-39, 40-49, and 50-64) are reported in Table 3-2.24 The GHQ 
health index variable follows the studies by Cameron, Trivedi, Milne and Piggott (1988) 
and Campbell, Walker and Farrell (2003) and takes values from 0 to 16.25 Value of 
GHQ=16 indicates the individual is in very poor health. To avoid sample bias due to 
observations for individuals who report 0 working hours per month, we use Tobit 
regression censored variable by variable. 26 
 
3-1 Results for Overtime Work Regressions: all aged 28-64  
Of all aged 28-64 in Table 3-1, we first tested if the health index variable 
(GHQ) and years of schooling (eduyr) are endogenous to overtime work (owh) of 
individuals. The Tobit result for an endogeneity test for GHQ and eduyr in the owh 
regression shows the estimated coefficient (t-statistic) on the eghat variable (the 
residuals obtained from the first-stage estimation of the reduced form equation of GHQ) 
is 10.867 (t = 5.61) and the estimated coefficient on the eedhat variable (the residuals 
obtained from the first-stage estimation of the reduced form equation of eduyr) is 6.717 
                                                  
24 The variables used in this study and their definitions and statistics are reported in Table 2. There 
are no observations on individuals under 28 years old. 
25 Our health index of GHQ variable consists of 16 questions on health of individuals. Answer to 
each question takes value of either 1 or 0. If an individual answers yes to all 16 questions, his or her 
GHQ becomes 16, indicating very poor health. The data are from the first National Family Research 
in 1998 (NFR98). The types of 16 questions are available on request from the first author. 
26 We calculate overtime work (owh) by using total working hours per month (twh) minus average 
contractual working hours per month in prefecture in 1998 (awh). Of the sample of 5482 
observations, there are 3106 individuals, whose overtime work becomes smaller than zero. Thus, we 
used a censored regression of Tobit model. 
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(t = 4.26), indicating both GHQ and eduyr are endogenous to overtime work 
(Wooldridge 2002, pp.118-122 and 2003, pp. 506-507).  
In specific, the first-stage reduced form equations of GHQ and eduyr include 
IVs (health, speduyr and pjobtype#, i.e., pjobtype0 to pjobtype45) in addition to the 
exogenous variables listed from unemp98 to city3 in Table 2. The first-stage F-values of 
the GHQ and eduyr regressions are 20.39 and 45.94, respectively, showing the high 
instrument relevance. And the overidentifying restriction tests of IVs (health, speduyr 
and pjobtype#) of GHQ and eduyr show IVs are exogenous to owh and twh. (Stock and 
Watson 2003, pp. 348-359), since the F-value for overidentifying restriction is 0.30 and 
the 2 ).( fdχ  value is the J-test=1.8 (i.e., 3.06×=mF ), which is smaller than 
78.72 26
2 == −− χχ km  at a 10% significance level.27 
 The 2SLS (1) regression result of owh (overtime work) in Table 3-1 shows the 
estimated coefficient of GHQ is -20.859 (t = -5.27), which is statistically significant at a 
1 percent significance level. Employees reporting more health problems are less likely 
to have overtime work. This result is also the same when we use the variable of 
individual’s total hours of work per month (twh) under 2SLS (2).28.Therefore, it is clear 
that individuals with better health work more overtime. The coefficient of education 
years (eduyr) is statistically negative as theoretically predicted. That is, more efficient 
employees at job tend to have less overtime work. 
 Of the estimated coefficients under 2SLS (1), the variable of unemp98 
(unemployment rate), reflecting labor market conditions in 1998 (when the survey data 
                                                  
27 The degrees of freedom of 2χ  are (m-k), where m is the number of IVs and k is the number of 
endogenous variables in the regression (i.e., ghq and eduyr).   
28 Since our empirical results are nearly the same for both owh 2SLS(1) and twh 2SLS(2), we will 
discuss on those obtained from the owh regression. 
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were collected), is statistically significant and in negative sign. We show in Section III 
whether an increase in unemployment rate lowers overtime work of employees or not in 
the short run depends on the value of the firm’s employment adjustment elasticity φε  
in Equation (8). Our empirical negative effect of unemp98 seems indicating the 
adjustment elasticity φε  is greater than one in absolute value. To put it differently, 
Japanese firms seem to adjust their production of output by quickly controlling overtime 
work of employees as a strategy in response to changes in market conditions in the short 
run. On the other hand, if we take the long-run health effect via unemployment on 
overtime work into consideration (see Equation (9)), the overall marginal 
unemployment effect on overtime work is about –2.86, which is less than a half of the 
short-run unemployment effect.29 In terms of the elasticity of overtime work with 
respect to unemployment rate, the short-run elasticity is about 0.56, while the long-run 
elasticity is about 0.24.30 Therefore, we might say firms will choose layoff rather than 
adjusting overtime work of employees in response to long-run market demand for their 
products. 
The variables of current job (pjobcon#) and firm sizes (compsize) are included 
in the regression to control characteristics of firms.31 Except the low-skilled work 
                                                  
29 862.2)178.0)(859.20(575.6
989898
−=−−+−=∂
∂
∂
∂+∂
∂=∆
unemp
GHQ
GHQ
owh
unemp
owh
dunemp
Ld
, 
where  178.0
98
−=∂
∂
unemp
GHQ
 is from the GHQ regression in Table 3-1. 
30 We use the averages of owh and unemp98 are 47.905 and 4.073, respectively. 
31 The variable of current job of employees (i.e., pjobcon#) is an instrument explaining monthly 
overtime work hours of employees, while the present job type of employees (i.e., pjobtype#) is also 
an instrument in explaining health of employees. Therefore, the pjobcon# variables are in the owh 
(or twh) regressions, but not in the GHQ regressions, whereas the pjobtype# variables are reversed. 
Especially, we support an idea that a choice of the type of present job by individuals is affected by 
their health endowment.  
16 
(pjobcon5), professionals (pjobcon1), administrators (pjobcon2), employees in charge 
of office work (pjobcon3), sales (pjobcon4) are more likely to work overtime, that is 
also identified with a US study by Brett and Stroh (2003) who found that employees 
with higher job status and more responsibility, e.g., managers, tend to choose more 
overtime work.  
 Most of the socio-economic individual characteristics studied here are 
significantly associated with overtime work of employees. An increase in spouse 
income (spincome) lowers overtime work. Negative effects are also found for 
employees who care the elderly at home (caredm), and are married (marrydm), whereas 
positive effects are with household head (hheaddm) and male work overtime (gender).32 
From these results, we find socio-economic factors hindering a job promotion of 
employee have negative effects on overtime work.33  
 
3-2 Results for the GHQ Health Index Regression 
 Of the GHQ (Tobit) regression in the last column in Table 3-1, although not 
reported in the table, the residuals obtained from the first-stage estimation of the 
reduced form equation of overtime work (owh) are not statistically significant in 
explaining the GHQ health index, indicating that overtime work of employees is not 
endogenous to their health.34 We, therefore, report only the regression results of the 
                                                  
32 For the variable of chid06 (having children under 6 years old) in the regression of only female 
employees (not shown in Table), we find the estimate coefficient is statistically significant at a 5 
percent significant level with negative sign, i.e., –25.122 (t=-2.03), which shows women with more 
children under 6 tend to work less overtime. 
33 In a work-leisure choice model, these negative effects are often explained as due to higher 
opportunity costs of having overtime work. In our present model, factors giving negative effects on 
overtime work are negatively affecting job promotion of employees in the firm, consequently 
influencing labor earnings, whose expected utility employees maximize. 
34 The estimated coefficient of the residuals of owh is -.0017 (t = -0.37). 
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GHQ Tobit model in Table 3-1, in which the estimated coefficient of overtime work 
(owh) is 0.030 (t = 31.87).35 Of the relationship between overtime work and health of 
employees, we consider that an increase in exogenous overtime work of employees 
deteriorates their health first and then poor health condition of employees consequently 
reduces overtime work of employees.  
The estimated coefficient of unemployment rate (unemp98) is -0.178(t=-3.21), 
whose negative sign is congruent with the previous studies (Gerdtham and Ruhm 2002, 
Ruhm 2003, and Grossman 2004). The effect of year of education completed (eduyr) is 
also negative on GHQ, implying more efficient persons are more likely to be in good 
health, ceteris paribus. Of the other socio-economic characteristics of individuals in the 
GHQ regression, we find the estimated coefficients of income of spouse (spincome), 
and married (marrydm) are significantly negative, showing that good health is 
associated with these characteristics.  
 
3-3 Results for Overtime Work Regressions: employees aged 28-39, 40-49, and 50-64 
 In Table 3-2, the estimated coefficient of the GHQ health index variable is 
statistically significant for employees aged 40-49 and 50-64, but not for those aged 
28-39. Since the signs of the estimated coefficients are all negative, employees with 
better health are more likely to work overtime, but this relationship is more prevalent 
among older employees. On the other hand, changes in labor market conditions 
influence overtime work of relatively younger employees, indicating firms are likely to 
use overtime work of younger employees in response to labor market conditions, i.e., 
fluctuations of market demand for their products.  
                                                  
35 Again, let us note that higher value of the GHQ variable implies worse health condition of the 
individual. 
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The variable of current job (pjobcon#) has a predominantly significant effect 
on their overtime work among employees aged 40-49 and 50-64. Therefore, we can 
expect there are more health problems with these age groups due to excessive overtime 
work. Among the socio-economic characteristics of individuals, younger employees 
with higher spouse-income (spincome) work less overtime, whereas household head 
(hheaddm) and male (gender) work more overtime.  
 In sum of our empirical findings, first of all, most of our findings in this study 
support the hypothesis that overtime work of employees is built into the system of job 
promotion, therefore, overtime work among Japanese employees is prevalent despite the 
adverse effects on their health. Second, employees with good health tend to work 
overtime, but excessive overtime work is likely to result in their deterioration of their 
health, which consequently lowers their overtime work.  
Third, overtime work of employees are strongly cyclical – falling during an 
economic recession, which indirectly supports the evidence from US studies that health 
improves in a recession, since overtime work of employees deteriorates their health. 
Fourth, of the various socio-economic characteristics of individuals analyzed in this 
study, income and other factors hindering job promotion of employees, such as caring 
for the elderly in the household and being female, cause less overtime work of 
employees. Finally, years of schooling have a strong negative effect on overtime work. 
This indicates more efficient employees are less likely to do overtime work, ceteris 
paribus. 
19 
IV. Summary and Conclusion 
Japan is on the list of high longevity countries. However, a large number of 
health problems of employees were reported during recessions in the 1990s. 
Deterioration of working conditions, e.g., overtime work of employees and its adverse 
effects on their health, have become a hotly debated social issue. This paper focuses on 
the topic of the relationship between overtime work and health of employees, whose 
related issue has been increasingly addressed in literature.  
In this paper, we present a theoretical model based on our hypothesis that 
overtime work of employees is implicitly built into the promotion system made in a 
firm. That is, a typical employee has choices to allocate his time per period between 
health production and overtime work in the firm. Better health of the individual results 
in higher expected utility of income, while overtime work brings about higher wages 
through the job promotion in the firm.  
The following predictions are provided in our theoretical model: first, excessive 
overtime work will cause health deterioration of individual employee. Second, the 
incentives of a typical employee accepting overtime work is influenced by the 
parameter attached with the promotions system of the firm leading to higher income in 
the next term. Third, a more efficient individual reflected by more years of education 
completed tends to have less overtime work per period than one with less education. 
Finally, the effect of unemployment rate reflecting labor market conditions on overtime 
work of employees depends on the employment adjustment factor in the firm in the 
short run and the via-health effect as well in the long run. 
This paper provides the empirical analysis to test our theoretical model. Our 
analysis used a micro data of 6,985 individuals from the first National Family Research 
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in 1998 (NFR98) made by the National Family Research of Japan (NFRJ) of the Japan 
Society of Family Sociology (JSFS: Nihon Kazoku Shakai Gakkai, in Japanese) and 
provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Institute of Social Science, 
University of Tokyo. To avoid sample bias due to the observations for individuals who 
report 0 working hour per month, we use Tobit regression censored variable by variable. 
Our empirical results show: first, the causal chain goes from better health of employees 
to more overtime work and eventually to a deterioration of employee’s health; second, 
years of education completed of individuals, reflecting efficiency at job, is negatively 
associated with overtime work hours, as theoretically predicted. In other words, more 
efficient individuals tend to choose less overtime work. Third, overtime work of 
employees are strongly cyclical – falling during an economic recession, which indirectly 
supports the evidence from US studies that health improves in a recession. Fourth, 
among socio-economic individual characteristics studied here, the factors hindering job 
promotion of employee such as having the elderly to care at home and being female, are 
strongly and negatively associated with overtime work of employees.  
Despite the fact that Japan enjoys high longevity of population, there is still 
room left for the government to reduce individual health problems reported in the 1990s. 
One way to promote health of employees is to reduce unpaid excessive overtime work 
of employees and can be implemented in practice, if firms and the Japanese government 
reconsider the present promotion systems which are not explicitly expressed in the labor 
contract between employers and employees. Otherwise, the health of employees who 
work excessively overtime continue to deteriorate. 
21 
References 
Bejean, Sultan-Taïeb and Wolff 2003. A manuscript from LEG, Laboratoire d’Economie 
et de Gestion, CNRS UMR 5118, Univesité de Bourgogne.  
http://www.u-bourgogne.fr/LEG/bejean/e2003-11.pdf.(01/19/2004) 
Brett JM, Stroh LK. 2003. Working 61 plus hours a week: Why do managers do it? 
Journal of Applied Psychology 88(1): 67-78. 
Cameron, A. C., P. K. Trivedi, Frank Milne and J. Piggott. 1988. A microeconometric 
model of the demand for health care and health insurance in Australia. Review of 
Economic Studies 55: 85-106. 
Campbell, Alistair, Judith Walker, and Gerry Farrell. 2003. Confirmatory factor analysis 
of the GHQ-12: can I see that again? Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Psychiatry 37: 475-83. 
Geerdtham, Ulf-G.., and Christopher J. Ruhm. 2002. Deaths rise in good economic 
times: evidence from the OECD. National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper 9357.  
Grossman, Michael. 1972. On the concept of health capital and the demand for health. 
Journal of Political Economy 80 (2): 223-55. 
Grossman, Michael. 2004. Health Economics. NBER Report. Spring 2004: pp. 1-8. 
James H. Stock, Mark W. Watson. 2003. Introduction to Econometrics, Pearson 
Education, Inc. U.S.A. pp.348-359. 
Nishiyama K, Johnson JV. 1997. Karoshi-Death form overwork: Occupational health 
consequences of Japanese production management. International Journal of 
Health Services 27(4): 625-41. 
Ruhm, Christopher J. 2003. Good times make you sick. Journal of Health Economics 
22: 637-658. 
Spence, Michael. 1973. Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics 87 (3): 
355-74. 
Vaez-Zadeh, Reza, Danyang Xie, and Edda Zoli. 2002. MODIS: a market-oriented 
deposit insurance scheme. IMF Working Paper. International Monetary Fund. 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2002. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2003. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. Ohio: 
South-Western. 
 
 
22 
Appendix:  Effect of 0H  on L∆ , 
0ln
ln
Hd
Ld ∆  
From equation (5), we have Π=∆ 0
01 )(
H
THPP
L proα
ρβ &
. The differentiation with respect to 
0H  is as follows: 
(a) 
0
10
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
]ln)1(lnln[lnln)(lnln 10
dH
YPYPd
dH
Hd
dH
Td
dH
HPd
dH
Ld HH δρ −+−−+=∆ . 
Then, we have as, 
(b) 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+−
−−=+∆
1
0
0
010
010
0
0
ln)1(ln
]ln)1(ln[
1
1)1(
)(
1lnln
10
10
1
Y
dH
dP
Y
dH
dP
YPYP
H
P
HPdH
Td
dH
Ld
HH
HH
H
δρδρ
δ
, 
where )1()(
1
1
0
1
10
1 δ−⋅=∂
∂⋅∂
∂= HH PH
H
H
P
dH
HdP . 
Since 
0000
0 1)(ln
dH
Ld
TdH
LLd
dH
Td ∆−=∆−−Ω=  and 
LdH
Ld
T
T
dH
Td
dH
Ld
∆
∆
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=−∆ 1lnln
000
0
0
, 
Then, equation (b) becomes as, 
(c) 
]ln)1(ln[
ln)1(ln
1)1(
ln
ln
10
1
0
1)(
2
0)(
1
0
)(
00 10
1100
1 YPYP
H
H
YPYP
H
H
Hd
Ld
T
T
HH
HHPHHP
HP δρ
σδρσ
ηδ −+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−+
−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−=∆⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ , 
where 
)( 1
1
)(
1
1 HP
HPH
HP =η , 0
0
000
0
)( <=
H
HHHP P
HPσ  and 0
1
111
1
)( <=
H
HHHP P
HPσ . 
Then, we rearrange the above equation by using some simpler notations as, 
(d) 01
)1(
)1(
ln
ln 1)(
0
01)(
)(
1
00
0
10
1
≥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Π
Π−Π−
Π−−=∆ HPHPHP H
H
H
H
T
T
Hd
Ld σ
δ
σηδ , 
23 
as 1
)1(
)1()1(
0
0)(01)(
)(
1
0 10
1
≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Π−
Π−+Π−−=Ψ
H
HH
H
H HPHP
HP δ
σδσηδ , 
where 00 ln0 YPH=Π , 11 ln)1( 1 YPHδρ −=Π  and 21 Π+Π=Π . 
24 
Figure 1 Trend of sudden death due to overwork (Karoushi, in Japanese): 1990-2001 
Trend of sudden death due to overwork: 1990-2001
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Table1-1 The relationship between health condition and wok hours (Male): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  a: person in poor health refers to a person who reported that 「health condition is worse」 or 「health condition is the worst」 
b: the number of persons under 39 years old and working for 0 days monthly is 32, and 25% of them are reported to be in poor health. 
Source: The First National Family Research in 1998 (NFR98), The Social Science Japan Data Archive, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo. 
Table1-2 The relationship between health condition and wok hours (Female): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: See note of table 1-1. 
  Work Hours per Month 
Age 
 
0 hour 
1~80 
hours 
81~160 
hours 
161~240 
hours 
241~320 
hours 
321~400 
hours 
Total 
Number of People 34 2 140 487 107 20 790 Less than  
40 years old Ratio of those people in poor health 0.236 0.000 0.093 0.109 0.131 0.100 0.114 
Number of People 35 6 146 411 110 22 730 
40~49 years old 
Ratio of those people in poor health 0.343 0.334 0.090 0.098 0.155 0.182 0.121 
Number of People 163 17 250 529 98 24 1081 
50~64 years old 
Ratio of those people in poor health 0.344 0.412 0.184 0.137 0.154 0.167 0.185 
Number of People 232 25 536 1427 315 66 2601 Total (Less than 65 
years old) Ratio of those people in poor health 0.328 0.360 0.135 0.116 0.147 0.152 0.145 
  Work Hours per Month 
Age 
 
0 hour 
1~80 
hours 
81~160 
hours 
161~240 
hours 
241~320 
hours 
321~400 
hours 
Total 
Number of People 346 95 250 174 9 0 874 Less than  
40 years old Ratio of those people in poor health 0.116 0.148 0.112 0.098 0.111 0.000 0.114 
Number of People 209 103 276 182 14 0 784 
40~49 years old 
Ratio of those people in poor health 0.177 0.136 0.138 0.143 0.072 0.000 0.148 
Number of People 519 124 279 245 44 9 1220 
50~64 years old 
Ratio of those people in poor health 0.237 0.153 0.176 0.143 0.205 0.222 0.194 
Number of People 1074 322 805 601 67 9 2878 Total (Less than 65 
years old) Ratio of those people in poor health 0.186 0.146 0.143 0.130 0.164 0.222 0.157 
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Table 2 Variable List and Definition 
All (Age: 28 – 64) Age : 28 - 39 Age: 40 - 49 Age: 50 - 64 
Variable Definition 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
ghq health indexa 3.929 2.601 3.892 2.612 3.904 2.632 3.972 2.573 
health health dummy (good=1, bad=0) 0.848 0.359 0.886 0.318 0.865 0.341 0.810 0.393 
twh total working hours per month (=wkhour*wkday) 134.342 92.148 138.278 91.261 148.050 86.134 122.479 95.108 
awh average contractual working hours per month in prefecture in 1998.  167.268 2.951 167.079 2.996 167.464 2.915 167.275 2.934 
owh overtime working hours per month (=twh –awh) -32.926 91.565 -28.800 90.553 -19.414 85.478 -44.796 94.656 
Owh (owh>0) overtime working hours per month (=twh –awh>0) 47.905 41.699 46.375 39.198 50.554 41.493 47.164 43.850 
unemp98 average unemployment rate in prefecture in 1998 4.073 0.917 4.108 0.915 4.042 0.934 4.069 0.907 
eduyr years of education completed (=graduation age – 6) 12.253 0.430 13.011 4.502 12.731 4.146 11.391 4.168 
speduyr years of spouse’s education completed 12.068 3.208 12.335 3.423 12.649 3.192 11.492 2.954 
jobyr working years (＝current age– age at the first job) 12.472 14.046 12.859 14.265 12.170 14.009 12.391 13.910 
pjobtype0 type of current job: manager=1, otherwise=0 0.030 0.170 0.033 0.179 0.030 0.172 0.027 0.162 
pjobtype1 type of current job: employee=1,otherwise=0 0.420 0.494 0.421 0.494 0.420 0.494 0.418 0.493 
pjobtype2 type of current job: part-time=1, otherwise=0 0.122 0.328 0.126 0.332 0.118 0.323 0.122 0.328 
pjobtype45 type of current job: self owner or employee of self owner=1, otherwise=0 0.100 0.298 0.108 0.310 0.083 0.276 0.102 0.303 
pjobcon1 content of current job: professional technology=1, otherwise=0 0.143 0.350 0.204 0.403 0.143 0.350 0.100 0.300 
pjobcon2 content of current job: administrative=1, otherwise=0 0.064 0.244 0.018 0.133 0.077 0.266 0.089 0.284 
pjobcon3 content of current job: office=1, otherwise=0 0.221 0.415 0.300 0.459 0.218 0.413 0.165 0.371 
pjobcon4 content of current job: sales and service=1, otherwise=0 0.233 0.423 0.218 0.413 0.230 0.421 0.245 0.430 
pjobcon5 content of current job: low skill=1, otherwise=0 0.281 0.449 0.234 0.424 0.280 0.449 0.315 0.465 
compsize company size   186.281 370.546 190.386 374.046 186.836 374.394 182.948 365.558 
spincome income of spouse (in ten thousand yen) 272.927 330.433 233.810 298.093 310.809 348.316 276.270 337.521 
caredm care dummy ( having experience of caring the elderly =1, otherwise=0) 0.142 0.349 NA NA NA NA 0.337 0.473 
child06 number of children under six years old in the household 0.161 0.491 0.496 0.765 0.035 0.226 0.001 0.047 
hheaddm head of household dummy (head=1, otherwise=0) 0.446 0.497 0.345 0.475 0.455 0.498 0.514 0.500 
marrydm marriage dummy (married=1, otherwise=0) 0.890 0.313 0.752 0.432 0.921 0.270 0.970 0.171 
gender gender dummy (male=1, female=0) 0.474 0.499 0.475 0.500 0.482 0.500 0.469 0.499 
city1 size of city dummy 1 (13 big cities=1, otherwise=0) 0.194 0.395 0.214 0.410 0.183 0.387 0.186 0.388 
city2 size of city dummy 2 (population over 100 thousands=1, otherwise=0) 0.378 0.485 0.397 0.489 0.363 0.481 0.375 0.484 
city3 size of city dummy 2 (population less than 100 thousands=1, otherwise=0) 0.191 0.393 0.178 0.383 0.196 0.397 0.196 0.367 
observations  5482 1664 1515 2303 
Note a: The variable of this index is based on the sixteen questions on the individual’s health situation such that “yes” is 1 and “no” is 0.  
Source: The First National Family Research in 1998 (NFR98), The Social Science Japan Data Archive, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo. 
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Table 3-1 Regression Results (Age: 28 − 64) 
 owh twh GHQ  
Variables 2SLS (1) 
2SLS 
(2) OLS 
owh --- --- 0.030 (31.87)a 
GHQhat -20.859(-5.27)a
-20.903
(-5.28)a --- 
eduyrhat -11.939(-3.73)a
-12.095
(-3.78)a --- 
unemp98 -6.575(-2.59)a
-7.369
(-2.89)a
-0.178 
(-3.21)a 
eduyr --- --- -0.036 (-3.30)a 
jobyr -0.138(-0.87)
-0.163
(-1.03)
-0.004 
(-1.17) 
pjobtype0 0.206 (0.75) 
pjobtype1 --- --- -0.005 (-0.04) 
pjobtype2 --- --- 0.424 (2.61)a 
pjobtype45 --- --- 0.117 (0.72) 
pjobcon1 64.461(4.60)a
64.979
(4.63)a --- 
pjobcon2 57.904(3.91)a
54.141
(3.92)a  --- 
pjobcon3 31.859(2.60)a
32.112
(2.62)a --- 
pjobcon4 56.259(5.31)a
56.441
(5.33)a  --- 
pjobcon5 12.222(1.18)
12.317
(1.19) --- 
compsize -0.001(-0.31)
-0.002
(-0.46)
0.000 
(0.01) 
spincome -0.039(-4.21)a
-0.039
(-4.24)a
-0.000 
(-3.68)a 
caredm -86.406(-11.81)a
-86.747
(-11.86)a
0.049 
(0.31) 
child06 1.888(0.43)
1.735
(0.39)
-0.023 
(-0.24) 
hheaddm 27.670(4.25)a
27.674
( 4.25)a
-0.039 
(-0.28) 
marrydm -31.326(-3.92)a
-31.326
(-3.92)a
-0.559 
(-3.56)a 
gender 154.692(19.12)a
156.897
(19.39)a
0.194 
(1.34) 
city1 -9.461(-1.33)
-11.628
(-1.64)
-0.255 
(-1.63) 
city2 -11.515(-1.97)b
-12.316
(-2.11)b
-0.345 
(-2.75)a 
city3 -11.370(-1.73)c 
-11.588
(-1.76)c
-0.391 
(-2.70)a 
Constant 83.320(1.65)c
256.011
(5.07)a
3.678 
(11.72)a 
Observations 5482 5482 5482 
Left-censored 3106 3106 3106 
LR chi2 1805.50 1835.79 2269.15 
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.052 0.154 
Note:  t statistics are in parentheses.  a: significant at 1%.  b: significant at 5%.  c: significant at 10%.   
Source: The First National Family Research in 1998 (NFR98), the Social Science Japan Data Archive, 
Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo. 
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Table 3-2 Regression Results by Different Age Groups 
 owh 
Variables 2SLS (Age: 28 – 39) 
2SLS 
(Age: 40 – 49) 
2SLS 
(Age: 50 – 64) 
GHQhat -9.335(-1.17)
-11.648
(-1.83)b
-29.937 
(-4.74)a 
eduyrhat -2.159(-0.30)
-6.509
(-1.34)
-18.106 
(-3.61)a 
unemp98 -6.489(-1.68)c
-9.119
(-2.23)b
-1.880 
(-0.40) 
jobyr 0.218(0.90)
-0.056
(-0.23)
-0.596 
(-2.01)b 
pjobcon1 40.739(1.77)c
         77.901 
(3.54)a
53.018 
(2.16)b 
pjobcon2  39.555(1.29)
77.278
(3.37)a
77.592 
(2.99)a 
pjobcon3 10.403(0.47)
29.750
(1.50)
43.145 
(2.09)b 
pjobcon4  34.656(1.45)
50.269
(2.86)a
85.757 
(4.96)a 
pjobcon5 6.377(0.23)
19.544
(1.16)
28.946 
(1.74)c 
compsize -0.000(-0.03)
0.013
(1.46)
-0.010 
(-0.94) 
spincome -0.103(-5.75)a
-0.043
(-3.02)a
0.003 
(0.21) 
caredm NA NA -83.187 (-9.26)a 
child06 -0.415(-0.10)
-15.997
(-1.02)
-78.940 
(-0.90) 
hheaddm 38.849(4.43)a
18.924
(1.80)c
58.328 
(3.89)a 
marrydm -21.206(-1.81)c
12.002
(0.80)
13.765 
(0.60) 
gender 146.364(9.38)a
140.010
(11.53)a
130.935 
(8.66)a 
city1 -0.745(-0.07)
-3.017
(-0.24)
-25.741 
(-1.91)c 
city2 -16.964(-1.91)c
-8.852
(-0.91)
-14.254 
(-1.33) 
city3 -27.225(-2.49)b
1.154
(0.11)
-5.851 
(-0.48) 
Constant -56.104(-0.46)
-29.189
(-0.35)
82.924 
(1.19) 
Observations 1664 1515 2303 
Left-censored 887 815 1404 
LR chi2 890.82 585.51 524.86 
Pseudo R2 0.078 0.057 0.038 
Note:  t statistics are in parentheses.  a: significant at 1%.  b: significant at 5%.  c: significant at 10%.   
Source: The First National Family Research in 1998 (NFR98), the Social Science Japan Data Archive,  
Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo. 
 
 
 
